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OF HuMAN FREEDOm. By Jacques Barzun. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1939. Pp. 334.
M .BARzuN has written a spirited and witty defense of individual liberty,
a valuable counter-irritant to the numerous totalitarian philosophies now
competing for the loyalty of the world. Democracy, his argument runs, is
not a system but a culture; its essence lies not in forms of government or
indeed in any forms, but in concrete practice by persons, and in the values
they hold. It can never be perfect, since there are so many tyrannies, open
and disguised, that encroach upon it on every hand. It can be advanced,
however, by the unremitting effort of each to act for himself in sturdy
piecemeal opposition to every senseless rigidity wherever he finds it.
Democracy is only betrayed by slogans, collective orthodoxies and the com-
mon device of defending ourselves against one absolute by embracing another.
No matter what creed or hypothesis is offered us, we can safely use it only
by discrimination in the acceptance or rejection of particulars.
From this sturdy platform he snipes with his squirrel-gun at the absurdi-
ties of numerous contemporary absolutes - revolutionary culture, esthetic
classicism, race supremacy, the pedantry of science and "scholarship," pro-
gressive education, and the myth of perfect government. Nowhere is he
more effective than in ridiculing the vacuities of learned language. "No one
says 'To be or not to be'; it is always 'The matter of existence considered
in terms of a debatable question."' Or, instead of writing, "Brothers and
sisters often fight," the child psychologist intones, "Siblings evince a ten-
dency towards mutually antagonistic responses." Social science "is one long
sausage string of terminology and nomenclature." "When a family tries a
new brand of corn flakes it is an experiment. When the window sticks, we
have a method. A fact is not a fact but a piece of data; we no longer simply
'try' anything." And so, "false literacy and science worship have made us
into a people of imitative pedants." To educate, as Aristotle said, is not to
present the student with a pair of shoes but to impart to him the art of
shoemaking.
But, with all this wholesome urge for directness, clarity and diversity,
Mr. Barzun himself is betrayed by one of the oldest dich6s in the liberal
tradition-a dogma that is as dangerous as any other. This is a universal
distrust of government. The less government the better, he seems to believe,
and the only possible change in government is a change in the persons who
compose it. The moment a person gets behind a governmental desk he
becomes a different person-a ruler. Where has Mr. Barzun lost his
power to discriminate, his deep feeling for distinctions? Surely no more
arrogant absolute was ever uttered than that "to date there has been on
this earth only one kind of government, to wit, oligarchy, or the rule of
the few." That is a convenient enough stick with which to beat those who
want to exchange our government for something better, but if Mr. Barzun
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were subject to a worse government than ours -and there are several now
flourishing in the world - he might trip over it.
This attitude toward government is not just a single logical slip which
may be excised from the rest of his thinking without injuring it. It is the
spot where the weakness of his body of thought comes most clearly to the
surface. After all that he has said is said - however pungently and truly
- there is something besides individual virtue in a society that allows
anybody to be as free and conscientious as Mr. Barzun is in this book.
Something of which he is not conscious insulates his cultivated urbanity
from the rude lightnings that might under other weathers burn it crisp.
Science, art and liberty, however necessary to the human soul, are also
luxuries that can be achieved only at a price.
The author confronts none of the classic problems of freedom. What is
the meaning of the individual man apart from the society in which he swims?
Where are the boundaries between the individual and the social? How much
do we need collective effort, and what kind, in making sure that we are
clothed, fed, housed, protected against hostile prowlers, and given leisure
enough to invite our souls? Whose freedoms do we want to safeguard,
and freedom to do what? Hitler himself is fighting for Lebensraien. If
there were not some social criterion, referrent to the liberties of others, he
might be the great exponent of liberalism.
GEOROGE SOULEt
New York City.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPANISH CIVIL STRIFE. By
Norman J. Padelford. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. Pp.
710. $6.00.
AMID the flood of books dealing with Spain's tragedy, no comprehensive
work on the legal and diplomatic aspects of the conflict had been published
until the appearance of this notable volume by Professor Padelford of the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In scholarship, objectivity, keen
analysis and monumental industry, it is a magnificent tribute not only to the
talents of the author but to the Fletcher School and to the Bureau of Inter-
national Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College which sup-
plied the wherewithal for research and publication.
Some of Professor Padelford's material appeared earlier in the American
Journal of International Law. Here it has been revised, amplified and
brought down to the end of the struggle. Five hundred pages of documents,
some of them translated and published for the first time, comprise the bulk
of the volume. They will prove invaluable to those in need of a full compila-
tion of source materials. The text, which is fully documented in itself, sur-
veys with brilliant historical and legal erudition the status of the contestants,
interference with foreign shipping, the non-intervention system, the role of
tEditor, THE NEW REPUBLIC.
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the League of Nations, a problem in diplomatic and consular relations, the
policies of the United States and the termination of hostilities. Here in well
ordered and readable form is not merely a full treatment of one of the major
diplomatic episodes of recent years but an extremely useful presentation of
all the problems and principles of international law pertaining to civil con-
flict and intervention.
In only one respect-but this a crucial one-does Professor Padelford ex-
pose himself to severe criticism. In his preoccupation with the narrowly
legal and diplomatic aspects of his subjects he has lost sight of the forest
because of the trees. In his Preface he disclaims any desire to write a his-
tory of the conflict or "to fathom the causes of the disturbance, to assay the
issues at stake, to trace the course of hostilities, or to analyze the political
consequences." And yet his valued judgments of diplomatic decisions are
inseparable from his unacknowledged assumptions on all of these matters.
He is elaborately judicious and impartial. Far above the dust of battle, he
is unconcerned with the human aspects of the disaster or with the moral and
political implications of the betrayal of the Spanish Republic to Fascism by
the governments of the western democracies. One might almost infer that he
welcomed Fascist victory, for he finds that League action and "non-inter-
vention," which played directly into Fascist hands, were "something of a
triumph for the collective system of handling international difficulties. The
weight of the League's influence was placed behind the principle that a p,ace-
ful and orderly society of States is predicated upon the fulfillment of duties
as well as upon the protection of rights." And again: "Credit is due to the
statesmen who were able to evolve the ambitious accords and the interna-
tional administration which have gone under the title of the Non-Interven-
tion system, and to their diplomatic acumen in enlisting as much coopera-
tion and observance as they did. None would deny the extensive circumven-
tions . . .Yet the net result in both law and diplomacy appears to have
been a gain."
A "gain" for whom? Dr. Padelford evidently believes that his story rep-
resents a gain for principles of law and practices of international collabora-
tion. He cannot or will not face the inescapable fact that the principles and
practices which he finds so praiseworthy had but one purpose and but one
result: the destruction by force of a legitimate and recognized democratic gov-
ernment by international Fascism, aided and abetted at every turn by the apos-
tles of "appeasement" in London and Paris. If this result was a "gain" for
order and law in the society of nations, then the abandonment of China, the
conquest of Ethiopia, the betrayal of the League of Nations, the destruction
of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Poland, would also appear to be
"gains."
Dr. Padelford is concerned with form rather than content, with words
rather than deeds, with shadow rather than substance. No system of law can
survive when its custodians pervert its principles to promote the cause of5
anarchy and injustice. And it is no answer for any legalist, however aca-
demic his pretentions, to reply that he is not concerned with justice or with
humanitarian considerations. A law which becomes a cloak for criminality is
a law which is doomed to death. If international law is to live, those con-
cerned with its survival must in the future make impossible such crimes as
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were committed against the people and government of Spain between 1936
and 1939.
FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN t
Williamstown, Massachusetts.
DIVIDENDS TO PAY. By E. D. Kennedy. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock,
1939. Pp. xvii, 305. $2.50.
IT would be a good deal easier to be fair about Mr. Kennedy's Dividcnds
to Pay if he had indicated more clearly for whom the book was written.
The style, described by the jacket as "lusty and spirited," and the filmy
character of much of the reasoning suggest that it is intended for the general
trade. If so, too rigorously scholarly an attitude would be out of place. The
grumpy academic too frequently insists on rigor at the expense of dramatic
effect. But Mr. Kennedy appears to believe he has discovered New Truth,
and not that he has merely staged the old more effectively. If, then, we have
what purports to be a contribution to economic thought, as well as a primer
for the public, we have some right to expect a reasonably careful analysis.
The first or "statistical" section of the book contains what, I suspect,
the author would regard as his significant new offering. Thus we run into
trouble right away in trying to restate Mr. Kennedy's thesis. The figures
are, as he alleges, simple enough. The statistics of income of the United
States Bureau of Internal Revenue show, to anyone who cares to glance
at them, that of all corporate net income (subtracting net losses) much the
greatest part in dollar volume is made yearly by a very small number of
corporations each making over a million dollars. They show, however,
that the proportion of corporate net income going to this million dollar class
increased sharply from 1925 to 1929. So much is clear and indisputable,
but equally without significance until interpreted.
Mr. Kennedy draws a remarkable number of inferences from these rather
meagre statistical facts. The following are some of the things he seems,
at least, to imply:
1. A small number of corporations make most of the dollar volume of net
income. This is undeniably true, and has been demonstrated before more
thoroughly by the Twentieth Century Fund in Big Business, its Growth and
Place. It should perhaps be pointed out that it is equally true that a small
number of companies (10% in 1929) make most of the losses (79% in 1929).
2. Big corporations make most of the money. This, though true (again
as demonstrated by the Twentieth Century Fund) is inadequately proven
by Mr. Kennedy, who bases his estimates of size wholly on net income and
c thus proves that the companies that make most of the money make most
of the money. Again we can flip the coin and show, using the same reason-
ing, that companies showing deficits of more than a million make most of
the losses, specifically, more than 48% of the deficit of all corporations in
1933. And these corporations were less than two one-thousandths of all active
t Professor of Political Science, Williams College.
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corporations! Even in 1929 less than one one-thousandth of all active cor-
porations made 447 of the losses, these being the ones that lost over a
million. This does not, of course, affect Mr. Kennedy's conclusion, though
perhaps it changes the overtones a bit.
3. Mr. Kennedy seems at times to be trying to prove that a small
number of individuals make most of the individual income. Everyone has,
of course, known this for years from individual income tax returns, but
Mr. Kennedy takes the hard way and tries to show that it is a result of the
lopsidedness of corporate income figures. He shows that some 17,0S8 people
each received in 1929 over $40,000 in dividends. Their total dividend receipts
equalled $1,950,000,000. By dividing this figure by the total dividend pay-
ments of 960 giant corporations, he gets a figure of .69. Therefore, he
implies apparently without logical qualms, these 17,088 persons owned 69%
of the 960 giant corporations. The conclusion is not only unrelated to the
premise, but is also probably wrong. It is hard to believe that such non
sequiturs can be due solely to innocent error.
4. One of the book's main contentions is that "a few companies thrive
monopolistically while the bulk of the companies are in danger of perishing
competitively." (p. 46). The argument is, in effect, that since "all the
companies with consistently large profits" (as measured in absolute money
terms) "are big companies" (as measured by their net money incomes) (p.
71), therefore only these few companies have a high rate of profit. Mr.
Kennedy concedes at one point that profits must be expressed as a percentage
of total investment to be compared with one another. But his only attempt
to do this is to take tventy-three large companies all of which made over
$20,000,000 either in 1929 or 1937 and calculate their percentage profits.
He calls this carefully selected group of the most profitable big corporations,
Industry, Inc., and speaks of it as "a representative section of big business."
(p. 169). In spite of this selection, excluding the big money losers and
moderate profit makers, he gets a profit ratio of only 11%c in 1925 and 13%
in 1929. According to the very careful recent study by Professor Crum of
Harvard, all the profitable corporations with less than $50,000 worth of
assets made an average of 12% of net worth in the depression year 1931.
Now the analyses of both Professor Crum and the Twentieth Century Fund
show that the big profitable companies as a group make a smaller per cent
of net worth than the little profitable companies and the same holds for
losses.
It is true that if you average losers and winners together, the big com-
panies on the average do somewhat better than the little, but this is because
a number of small companies make very large percentage losses and not
because small companies seldom make large percentage profits. Further,
as Mr. Henry Hazlitt points out, if you include in corporate profits the
salaries of officers, as in many cases seems reasonable, you find, as Professor
Crum has shown, that the rate of profit for losers and winners averaged
together declines rapidly as the size of the firm increases. Thus the lop-
sidedness of corporate earnings does seem to be due, in spite of 'Mr. Kennedy's
difficulty in believing it, largely to a similar lopsidedness in corporate net
worth.
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5. Another conclusion the author draws from the figures is that the
gains of the few big corporations from 1925 to 1929 were at the expense
of the many little ones, that "the profits of more than 99% of all corpora-
tions were being cut by more than a third" while the incomes of the million
dollar ones were increasing 40%o. (p. 16). It is equally true, separating off
the million dollar losers, that the losses of these giants increased by 65%
while the profits of much more than 99% of all corporations increased 18%.
Needless to say, nothing is proved by this sort of juggling. The truth is
that the profits of all profitable corporations making less than 1,000,000
dollars a year stayed almost constant in this period, while losses of losing
corporations (big and little) mounted to offset partly the gains of the big
ones. Of course, as Mr. Hazlitt has pointed out, all this reasoning takes
no account of changes in the numbers of corporations falling in these various
classes. Such changes, as one reviewer has contended, may not affect ma-
terially the result, but for all Mr. Kennedy appears to know, they might have
reversed it completely. One pie may come out well in spite of sloppy cooking,
but we are not encouraged thereby to eat more.
The author's conclusion that the recovery of 1937 favored the big boys
even more than that of 1929 is based entirely on his estimate that corporate
net income could not possibly be more than four billion in 1937. Now that
the Treasury Department has released the figure of well over seven billion,
some revision of his percentages is called for.
6. One more conclusion is drawn from the simple figures quoted, namely,
that the great monopoly corporations made money during the twenties not
only at the expense of little business - of all other business, but at the expense
of the whole American economy. It is Mr. Kennedy's conviction "that the
country as a whole was not prosperous" even in 1929, that during the boom
"there was very little increase in purchasing power." On this conviction,
nowhere supported, he bases his theory of the depression. It is an under-
consumptionist explanation of a sort that is very, very familiar indeed. As
the boom proceeds, profits pile up much more rapidly than wages, industry
expands its productive plant too rapidly for a lagging consumer demand
to keep it busy. Finally, the whole thing collapses. What is the statistical
evidence on this matter? According to the latest estimates by Dr. Sim6n
Kuznets, the national income paid out expanded from 1925 to 1929 by about
thirteen billion dollars, nearly 19%o, or almost thirteen times as much as
corporate net income expanded. Of this total national income, the proportion
going to wages and salaries increased from 68.1% to 69.2%, representing
an increase of about seven and a half billion dollars cash in the pockets of
consumers, while dividends to the greedy capitalist went up by one and a
half billion. One could go on citing figures of employment, production, etc.,
ad nauseam to demonstrate the patent absurdity of the contention that the
big corporations wrung the economy dry for their profits.
I have felt it worthwhile to examine in some detail Mr. Kennedy's "sta-
tistical" argument because it has been taken in some quarters to be an
important contribution to economic thought. The rest of the book- and
as the jacket says, there is "much, much more that can be read with ease
and joy"-is devoted to developing the contention that the only money-
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makers are monopolies, describing the decline of the classical entrepreneur
a la Berle and Means, extending the underconsumptionist argument, and
berating business for cutting costs by firing employees when demand is cut
in half! To explain the logical lacunae in this latter section on the ground
that the book is "popular" is to do the populace a great injustice.
A few samples will do as illustration. "Profits in American industry are
almost in direct proportion to the extent to which competition has been
eliminated." (p. 75). In the over-twenty-million income class fall great sleepy
monopolies like A. & P., the Woolworth Company, and Sears, Roebuck. The
losses of the depression "have all been borne by the middle-sized and little
fellows who still occupy a competitive, not a monopolistic, position in our
scheme of things." Yet the steel industry, which lost money in 1931, 1932,
1933 and 1934, "has been the most significant example of planned monopoly
that our industry affords." (p. 95).
Had the author read any good modern economics texts of the sort he
criticizes for being old-fashioned, he might have avoided such old-fashiuned
errors as measuring the degree of monopoly by the per cent of profit per
dollar of sales. If he had no axe to grind, would he compare employment
in 1918 with that in 1929 to prove that employment has fallen steadily, when
any year (except 1921) since that hectic war period, when every hand was
busy, would have shown employment substantially less than 1929?
As to the chapter on the False Fronts of Capitalism, those who like to
picture the industrialist plotting greedily in hotel rooms will be delighted
with it. Those who blame that man in the White House and his friends for
the troubles of business will grow purple under the collar. Those who find
the source of our ills not in devious machinations by any group but rather
in well-meaning confusion, ignorance, and stupidity will feel a little disap-
pointed that Mr. Kennedy has done so little to dispel the fog.
MAx MILLIKAN, lit
New Haven, Connecticut.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF JAMES WILSON: A Study in Comparative jur-
isprudence. By William F. Obering. Washington, D. C.: Issued by the
Office of the Secretary of the American Catholic Philosophical Associa-
tion, Catholic University of America, 1938. Pp. 276. $1.25.
Tis book does not give us a complete picture of the philosophy of law
of Ir. Justice Wilson. One cannot deal adequately With Wilson's views on
the separation of powers, the maintenance of state's rights, or the limitations
of the powers of government without dealing with the specific issues involved
against the background of the history of Wilson's time. The speeches of
Edmund Burke, to which Obering often refers, are no adequate substitute for
a careful analysis of what Mr. justice Wilson was talking about. It is Ober-
ing's thesis, however, that in the main the philosophy of law which Justice
Wilson had, he derived from Hooker who "sought his arguments in Aris-
totle, Augustine, Aquinas, Bellarmine, and others of the long line of scholastic
1 Instructor of Economics, Yale University.
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writers." The presentation of Wilson's views thus becomes in this book the
presentation of what is supposed to be the scholastic natural law. Obering's
Study reminds us of the importance of the natural law idea in American
history. It also explains inadvertently why the natural law idea is currently
in disrepute.
While Obering's study reminds us of the importance of the natural law
idea in American history, his study in this regard is quite incomplete and
sometimes misleading. It is correct to say that many of the founding fathers
believed in some theory of natural law. The reading list sent by Thomas
Jefferson to Peter Carr indicates the tradition in which some of the found-
ing fathers were at home.' And we know that Jeremiah Gridley told John
Adams that the lawyer in this country must study "not only the common law
but also civil law, and natural law, and admiralty law.' 2 But it is not cor-
rect to assume that all of the founding fathers had the same idea of the
natural law. Obering frequently reasons from the position ascribed to Wil-
son to the position of the founding fathers in general. Thus, because Wilson
justified the revolution on the rights of Englishmen does not justify the
statement that "Hence, also, we must deny Professor Mcllwain's conten-
tion that the final and fundamental constitutional demands of the Americans
found support in the doctrine of the English Radicals, who were more or less
under French Revolutionary influence, rather than in the traditional English
Whig doctrine." Obering's study would have been aided if he had referred
to Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts; Becker, The Heavcnly
City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers; Wright, Jr., American Inter-
pretations of Natural Law,3 and Merriam, American Political Theories.
Obering worries somewhat over Justice Wilson's refusal to accept the idea
that law always supposes a superior whose command it is, because he saw
"lurking the Divine right theory of Kings." The natural law idea is in dis-
repute partly because people suspect the kind of things that may be lurking
in its shadow. This book will do nothing to allay the suspicion. The author's
interpretation of Aquinas is contradictory. His statement that natural law
changes in operation and effect only in that our knowledge of it increases is
correct only if by natural law he means the first precept of the natural law and
the necessary conclusions, which would always be true. He is on safe ground
when he insists that the natural law is based on reason. But he then goes on
to claim that private ownership of property is necessary according to the
natural law, and actually cites Aquinas who says that "the ownership of pos-
sessions is not contrary to the natural law." 4 Obering has slid over the dis-
tinction between conclusions and determinations from the natural law, al-
though in another portion of his book he recognizes the distinction. Since
determinations can go either way, one arrives at a much less absolute view
of the law in action than Obering cares to espouse when he is talking about
private property. After his statement concerning reason, he concludes that
1. Letter of August 19, 1785.
2. Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law (1926) 20 Am. POL. SCi.
REv. 524, 525.
3. Ibid. 524 (1926).
4. In another place where Hooker says "determinations," Obering talks about
"authoritative conclusions." OBERING at 107.
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"without the supreme legislating Reason of God, the moral law becomes
nothing more than a code of table manners." He criticizes Wilson's theory
of the right of punishment (the prevention of crime) because Wilson did
not realize that "the right to punish for wrong doing is the original right of
Him, who is the Author and Guardian of the universal moral order, and can
be found in men only by participation." He feels that Wilson's theory is ob-
jectionable because it would not "allow the criminal law to take cognizance
of glaring offences against God such as public blasphemy, and it would deny
to criminal law the right to proceed against the lily-fingered gentleman anar-
chist, who confines his direct action to wild talk, and yet would demand, that
his poor dupe, who throws the bomb should be hanged." For some reason
Obering thinks that to deny the right of a court to overrule legislation is to
assert the "modern slave theory of the omnipotence of the State." The twist-
ing use that Obering is making of the natural law may make all of us won-
der about the shadows.
Finally, Obering misunderstands the modern legal realist. It is undoubtedly
true also that the modern legal realist misunderstands Obering, and would
misunderstand him even if he were clear. But to refer to Cardozo as the
advocate of juristic pragmatism which at the end means "unqualified tyran-
ny''5 is to treat the whole world as your enemy and is not a useful "letter to
the gentiles." 6
EDWARD H. LEvI i
Chicago, Illinois.
TREATY RELATIONS OF THE BRiTISH COMMONWEALTH Or NATIONS. By
Robert B. Stewart. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. Pp.
,xi, 503. $5.
THE LAW OF TREATIES. By Arnold D. McNair. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1938. Pp. xxix, 578. $7.50.
THESE two volumes, the first by a young American scholar, the second
by one of the outstanding British authorities on international law, fill a long-
standing gap in.the literature on British treaty practice. To say that each is
not only a definitive study in its field but also a model of scholarly analysis
and appraisal is to understate the merits of both these essays.
Dr. Stewart attempts, and with eminent success, to trace the evolution
and present pattern of intra-Commonwealth and international treaty-maling.
About one-third of the volume is devoted to the developments prior to 1914.
Another third deals with the post-1914 increase in Dominion independence
of Whitehall in treaty-making capacity. The final chapters are concerned
with present-day treaty-making procedure, the federal problem as to Canada,
Australia, and India, the I2tcr-Se doctrine as to Commonwealth treaties,
and the more technical aspects of treaty drafting. Fifteen appendias bring
S. I am afraid that C. K. Allen in his third edition of Law in the Mabing is simi-
larly unappreciative when he speaks of "Jazz Jurisprudence." ALrizn LAN%, III TH lAu-
iIG (3d ed. 1939) 45.
6. See AinER, ST. THOmAS AND THE GENTILES (1938).
'Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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together a judiciously selected list of documents, not easily available else-
where, illustrative of the history and present techniques in treaty procedure.
The author has produced what amounts to a manual of practice. It is
a field about which much has been written but in which little adequate
collation has been attempted.. His study not only of the official sources but
of British and Dominion literature makes the volume both authoritative
and informative. But it is more than a manual of practice. For at many
points where controversy over legal powers and correct procedure has arisen
in Dominion treaty-making, he offers critical comment as shrewd as it is
sound. His "summary and conclusion" is a searching review of the chief
problems of policy- such as armaments limitation, neutrality, Far Eastern
diplomacy in their bearings on independent treaty-making. He indicates
that, however independent in theory, the actual prerogative in treaty-making
for all members of the British Commonwealth is still vested in the Crown.
But since the Statute of Westminster (1931), the Crown has been divided,
in this field, into more parts than Gaul! Dr. Stewart does not attempt to
trace the implications of the division into the future. He has stated, with
admirable clarity and precision, the existing arrangements. His study is
indispensable to their intelligent understanding.
Dr. McNair, now Vice-Chancellor of Liverpool University, has once
more given us a model treatise in international law. It is indeed one of
those "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" referred to in
Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice-
which will take its place among the classics.
He treats his subject under the usual rubrics - the conclusion, the inter-
pretation, the scope and operation, and the termination and modification of
treaties. He has utilized not only the records of conferences and the evi-
dence from the treaties themselves, but the Foreign Office files. Here he
has discovered not only illuminating official memoranda and opinions but
many private and off-the-record correspondence which reveal the origins of
practice and the incidence of policy on legal action. On each major question
he synthesizes "practice and opinions" in a brief critical note which will
provide the diplomat, the jurist, and the student for many years to come
with the most authoritative available commentary.
It is impossible to summarize in a review- of any length- so detailed
a study as this. Fourteen subjects are treated under the conclusion of treaties,
thirteen under their interpretation, three under their scope and operation,
fourteen under their termination and modification. Over twenty pages are
devoted to the effect of war on treaties - a question now tragically again
paramount in the legal sections of foreign offices. Here, as throughout the
work, the numerous quotations and excerpts from hitherto unavailable
sources gives the author's comments unique and pragmatic value. Dr.
McNair has not only added to his already recognized stature as a scholar
but has made a very real contribution to Anglo-American "teachings" in
the field of international law.
PHILLIPS BRADLEYt
New York City.
' Professor of Political Science, Queens College.
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